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Every five years the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) presents a new cohort of 
senior cadres to run the world’s most populous country. The Party Congress is 
probably the most important date in China’s political calendar, equivalent to the 
moment white smoke rises from the Vatican when a new pontiff has  
been chosen.
October 18th 2017 will see the unveiling of the latest crop of senior party members to 
determine China’s next stage of development. But its implications will last longer than 
simply the five year term the new leaders will serve until the next Congress in 2022. 
In the past eighteen months, Western pundits and the media in Hong Kong have 
played the game of endless speculation and debate of who will be ‘in’ and ‘out’ at this 
prestigious conclave, which will not only choose leaders for the world’s second largest 
economy but also the world’s largest political party, with over 88 million members.
Like the Vatican, the CCP has always kept its conclave selection process a top 
secret. The official state media Xinhua News Agency will only disclose a seemingly 
choreographed process several months after the Congress with leadership approval 
(Xinhua, 2012a).
This Strategic Update makes no attempt to predict the leadership line-up to emerge 
from the October 2017 Congress, or speculate about the bargaining process between 
elites to choose the new team. Instead, it aims to provide a concise guide to what 
the CCP Congress is, why it is crucial to the rest of the world to keep watch on this 
particular political event, and how it is likely to impact upon Chinese policy. All the 
information in this update is drawn from publicly available sources.
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Media attention will most likely be focused 
on personnel changes at the very top, but 
there are other equally important tasks to be 
fulfilled during the gathering – producing 
a political report, and revising the Party 
constitution.  
The main question on analyst’s lips 
approaching the Congress is if Xi Jinping, as 
President and General Secretary of the CCP, 
is centralising power to an extent unseen 
since Mao (De Jonquieres, 2017; Fenby, 
2017; MacFarquahr, 2017; Saich 2017). 
However, the 2017 Congress is likely to see 
more continuity than radical change, within 
the constraints of institutionalised collective 
leadership. Such continuity derives from 
both the official and unspoken consensus 
amongst generations of CCP members, 
all the way back to its establishment in 
1921: Shakespeare’s quote “What’s past is 
prologue” could apply to the Party in 2017.
WhAT IS ThE CCP ConGrESS?
Many readers will ask a fundamental 
question: what is a CCP Congress and how 
does it differ from the conventional Western 
political party convention or conference?
Party Congresses are the most important 
political event in the Chinese political 
calendar. They are not to be confused with 
the two national congresses1 convened 
in early March every year as those are the 
congresses for the central government, not 
the Party.
 
 
According to the CCP Constitution, Party 
congresses are required to convene every 
five years. This convention was a key 
element of Deng Xiaoping’s 1978 reforms. 
He aimed to restore an institutionalised 
political process after a chaotic ten years of 
Cultural Revolution with numerous political 
purges and personal attacks involved in 
Party Congresses under Mao.
In keeping with Deng’s legacy, this Party 
constitutional practice has been rigorously 
followed since the 12th Party Congress in 
1982 (Deng, 1981; Ibid, 1982). This regularity  
in practice and the consistency of the 
procedure in Party Congress preperations 
open a rare window of opportunity to see 
inside one of the world’s most exclusive and 
influential organisations. 
Party congresses have prioritised three 
intertwined functions. 
Firstly, they establish the Party’s principal 
agenda across all policy sectors. It is 
the most authoritative body in the CCP 
organisational hierarchy and so its policy 
prescriptions reflect the CCP’s authoritative 
interpretations on all issues that the 
congress addresses. During the session, a 
Party congress offers a consensus-based 
evaluation of the Party’s work over the 
past five years since the previous congress 
and a thorough examination of the Party’s 
present situation, and also sets the principal 
guidance for the Party’s priorities and tasks 
for the next five years until the next session. 
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These overall judgments about the past work and future priorities come in the form of a 
very long and rather seemingly tedious “political report 政治报告”, usually delivered by the 
Party’s top leader, the General Secretary, in the name of the outgoing cohort of the most 
senior members of the CCP.
The second key function for the Party Congress is to revise the Party Constitution. The 
current Party Constitution was adopted at the 12th Party Congress in 1982, and every 
party congress since has introduced some changes and adjustments to it. Examples of 
changes could be amending the Party’s ‘guiding ideology’ set out in the constitution, Party 
recruitment criteria, or stipulations on membership in top leadership bodies. Despite 
the dry language of those changes in the Party Constitution, all those adjustments are 
politically significant because they endow the measures with final authority, at least  
in principle.
The third and the final task for the Party congress is to change the CCP’s top leadership, 
a task that attracts so much limelight and speculation in the West that many erroneously 
believe the sole function of the congress. The Party will also elect a new Central Committee 
and a new Central Commission for Discipline Inspection (CDIC) (see below). 
These three functions are fundamentally intertwined. Assessments of the success or failures 
of the party’s work in the previous five years affect the reputation and prospects of party 
leaders in power during that period. As the ‘political report’ shapes the political context, 
constitutional changes either strengthen the authority of General Secretary of the party or 
set the institutional constraints on the new leadership. 
WhAT IS A PLEnUm?
The work of the Party Congress doesn’t take place purely in the days it is in session. 
What is known as ‘The Party Congress’ is technically the first plenum of the new Party 
Congress. It opens a week after the seventh and final plenum of the previous party 
Congress. The tradition of plenum, or assemblies, has been established since the party 
was founded in 1921. Each modern Party Congress has seven plenums, with the final 
plenum administratively and certainly politically closely linked with the first of the new 
Congress in setting the political agenda. So in 2017, the seventh plenum of the 18th Party 
Congress takes place in early October and will prepare for the new Congress, for example by 
approving the shortlist of new Politburo nominees (see next page). 
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Who PArTICIPATES In ThE  
PArTY ConGrESS?
There are usually around 2,300 delegates 
from all levels of the CCP hierarchy across 
31 provinces. You can think of them as a 
‘pyramid’ with five layers.
At the bottom layer, there are around 
1,800 low-middle ranking party members 
chosen from across the country. They are 
usually governors and deputy governors 
at township-city level. In addition many 
celebrities, providing they are party members, 
are amongst participants at this level to 
mark the “inclusiveness” of the Party (Xinhua 
2012a). These include for example, current 
and former Olympic champions, astronauts, 
opera singers, and TV anchors, all alongside 
some ordinary workers such as bus drivers 
and steel workers.
Above these party members, on the fourth 
layer, is the Central Commission for Discipline 
Inspection (CDIC) with 130 members. 
Above the CDIC on the third layer is the CCP 
Central Committee, currently consisting of 
205 members with 171 alternate members. 
Members for those two committees are 
drawn from various central governmental 
ministries and provincial governments as well 
as key State-Owned Enterprises  
(SOEs), the Central Bank, and the People’s 
Liberation Army. 
Usually, the Central Committee contains party 
members who rank at ministerial level and 
party secretaries of provinces, a very small 
number of key SOE chairmen, the governor of 
the central bank, and commanders in chief of 
each PLA military region.  
 
The CDIC membership is comprised of deputy 
ministerial-level party members, deputy 
governors, deputy regional commander in 
chiefs, and a larger number of SOE chairmen. 
(Chairman of the majority of key SOEs and 
state owned banks are positioned at vice-
ministerial level in the Party hierarchy, with 
Figure 1. The Chinese Communist Party Congress
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some occasional exceptions. For example, 
the Chairman of the Bao Steel Company, 
the Chairman of China Investment 
Corporation, and the Chairman of China 
Railway Company who rank at full 
ministerial level (People’s Daily, 2012).)
Above the CDIC and Central Committee are 
the core of the congress: the Politburo and 
the Politburo Standing Committee. 
At the second level is the Politburo, which 
currently has 24 members2. This includes 
the leaders of some key municipalities and 
the heads of some of the most important 
ministries (which, unlike most Western 
countries, does not include the foreign 
minister). Currently 2 of the 24 members 
are female. 
Finally, on the top level is the Politburo 
Standing Committee, currently comprised 
of 7 members, headed by General Secretary 
Xi Jinping. (The 7 Politburo Standing 
Committee members remain among the 24 
members of the Politburo.)      
We can expect the top two levels to be 
significantly reshuffled during the Party 
Congress. However even in a year of 
change, it is very unlikely that this will 
include the first ever female member of the 
Politburo Standing Committee.
 
hoW IS ThE PoLITbUro ELECTED 
DUrInG ThE PArTY ConGrESS?
Unlike in liberal democracies with multi-
party contested elections, CCP Politburo 
members are not nominated by political 
campaigns and directly voted on  
by constituents.
According to Xinhua official coverage of 
the Party congresses there is a “democratic 
recommendation民主推荐” procedure, 
essentially a straw poll, of all those who 
will be participating in the Party Congress. 
All participants in the Congress are then 
given a ballot listing the names of around 
200 candidates in stroke order (the Chinese 
equivalent to Alphabetical order) (Xinhua, 
2012). The “recommendation” process, or 
short-listing procedure, is completed in the 
run up to the start of the Congress.
A few senior delegates may express 
their preferences to their colleagues 
anonymously during this process. All of 
the shortlisted candidates must meet the 
criteria for membership in the Politburo: 
serving at either a ministerial rank or above 
or in the PLA at military region level or 
above, and be a maximum of 62 years old.
Based on the tally of this straw poll 
and current Politburo members’ own 
preferences, the current Politburo and 
Standing Committee will approve 
the proposed nominees, conclude 
the Seventh Plenum of the 18th Party 
Congress and call for the 19th Congress 
(Xinhua, 2017). The delegates at the Party 
Congress then formally, or ceremonially, 
cast their votes for the Politburo at the 
Party Congress although the result is 
pre-agreed, somewhat similarly to the US 
Electoral College.
The process of “democratic 
recommendation”, ironic as it may sound, 
is one of the institutionalised procedures 
advocated by Deng in 1982 (Deng, 1982).  
Xi Jinping’s predecessor Hu Jintao 
promoted this process when he succeeded 
6      LSE IDEAS Strategic Update 17.4
Jiang Zemin as in 2002. It was widely seen as a part of his effort to expand “intra-party 党内
民主” democracy.
The leadership announces the results of the new full Central Committee and Politburo 
members in stroke order, and the results of alternate members of the Central Committee 
according to the number of votes they received in the Congress, both via official press 
release (Xinhua, 2012b).
The nomination process is supervised by a troika consisting of the Party General Secretary, 
supported by the Executive Secretary of the Party Secretariat and the Head of the Party 
Organisation Department. In 2017 this will be Xi Jinping, Executive Secretary Liu Yunshan, 
and Organisation Department Head Zhao Leji.
If the CCP continues to follow the convention practiced in the past twenty years, Politburo 
members over the age of 67 will retire from the Politburo and the Standing Committee. In 
which case, 5 of the 7 current Standing Committee members; and 6 out of 17 other Politburo 
members will step down. (In addition, 4 of the 11 Party Central Military Committee members 
would be expected to retire.)
Despite the intense speculation in the Western press, there will be no solid information on 
the composition of the 19th Party Congress leadership until 18th October 2017. All guesses 
before that are rather futile.
 
hoW ArE ThE CCP PoLITbUro STAnDInG  
CommITTEE mEmbErS ChoSEn?
Analysis of appointments to the Politburo Standing Committee (PSC) has never been a 
straightforward process. Some have filled the vacuum of information with stories of intra-
party factional infighting and intense personal competition. However, the history of these 
appointments can shed some light on this very opaque area. 
The PSC consists of between five and nine members depending on each Congress. It is the 
supreme decision-making entity of the Communist Party as well as the People’s Republic of 
China. 
If the 19th Congress follows precedent and convention, there are three de-facto rules to be 
followed. The extent to which past procedure is applied could act as a bellwether to whether 
Xi Jinping is centralising power and authority. 
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Firstly, the retirement of PSC and Politburo 
members at the age of 68. This age limit is 
colloquially known as “Eight down, Seven 
up”. The retirement age for PSC members 
was 70 during the 15th Congress in 1997 
and lowered to 68 in 2002. (Miller, 2016). 
Secondly, new appointments to the 
PSC have been drawn exclusively from 
regular members of Politburo. The only 2 
exceptions to this ‘rule’ so far were when 
Xi Jinping and Li Keqiang were appointed 
at the 17th Party Congress in 2007. Neither 
of them had previous experience serving 
on the Politburo, and they were added 
to prepare them to succeed Hu Jintao 
and Wen Jiabao as General Secretary and 
Premier respectively in 2012. If the 19th 
Party Congress will have any exceptions 
remains to be seen.
This exception follows the third convention, 
which PSC appointees are among the 
youngest senior party leaders eligible. With 
potentially 5 PSC vacancies, two younger 
appointees might be expected in 2017 so 
that they can succeed Xi and Li in 2022.
However, these ‘rules’ are only derived from 
precedence. Elite politics is a ruthless game, 
irrespective of the political system. 
But while sensational headlines about 
factional politics and personal rivalries 
please the crowds, the CCP tends to value 
continuity and procedure over change. 
As indicated by Deng Xiaoping himself, 
“party leadership transition should be 
institutionalised and thoroughly consulted 
and examined” (Deng, 1980). The Party 
typically makes the most important 
decisions via collective leadership: a 
hard lesson learnt after the decade 
long traumatic period of the Cultural 
Revolution.3 This sense of continuity helps 
the top leadership to preserve the Party’s 
survival and legitimacy.
If the final appointments from the 19th 
Congress significantly differ from those de-
facto ‘rules’ listed above, it could indicate 
two things. Firstly, the CCP faces a new set 
of challenges and requires new rules to be 
introduced to shape the top leadership. 
Or secondly, the pundits are right, and Xi 
Jinping has gained substantial personal 
power which allows him to bypass the 
collective leadership system endorsed by 
Deng and choose appointees based on 
his own personal taste. However, there 
has thus far been little evidence from the 
official media to act as an early warning of 
such a seismic shift.
WhAT WILL bE InCLUDED In  
ThE 19Th ConGrESS  
PoLITICAL rEPorT?
As mentioned above, personnel 
appointments and reshuffles are not the 
only critical business to be discussed and 
decided at the Party Congress. Another 
key function for the Congress is to discuss 
a lengthy ‘political report’ delivered by the 
CCP General Secretary on behalf of the 
outgoing Central Committee.
Bland as its name may be, this political 
report is the most authoritative public 
account of the CCP’s policy on all major 
policy fronts. It contains a laundry list of key 
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policies undertaken by the outgoing Central 
Committee in the past five years, and puts 
forward guidance for future policy in all 
relevant sectors. Over 22,000 words long in 
English (Xinhua 2012b), much of which is 
jargon, it’s not a page turner you’d want as 
your bedside read. But the political report 
shouldn’t be overlooked. 
It largely represents the CCP collective 
leadership, as well as what the Party thinks 
in general. The 19th Congress report should 
not be considered Xi Jinping’s personal 
views, nor should it be counted as another 
of Xi’s speech to his comrades. Like any 
other key functions of the Party Congress, 
the political report carries a strong sense 
of continuity, while reflecting some either 
moderate or radical departures from the 
past based on what has happened in the 
last five years when the previous  
Congress assembled.
Given its sheer breadth and width, a political 
report takes almost 12 months to draft and 
be reviewed by all the relevant stakeholders 
(Xinhua 2012a). Those who can participate 
in reviewing process are: regular Politburo 
members, Central Committee members, 
retired Party grandees, a limited number of 
academics, and some selected non-Party 
members. Drafting the political report is a 
strenuous effort to include all interested  
groups’ voices.
The Congress political report sheds some 
light on competition amongst senior party 
members and compromises amongst vested 
interest groups, through the development 
of flexible formulations to allow different 
factions to agree with one another. It’s 
a summary of the party’s achievements 
and plans expressed as lowest common 
denominator of consensus in the party at 
Zhongnanhai (Headquarters of the Chinese 
Communist Party). 
Looking at the political reports from the 
past three Congresses, there is a relatively 
standard formula with lots of continuation 
in the report structure. It includes sections 
on the party’s ‘works’, ideological discussion, 
economics, domestic politics, foreign affairs, 
cultural reform, and social developments. 
Perhaps surprisingly, the reports still adhere 
to a Marxist-Leninist approach - with 
economics and the means of production as 
the ‘base’, and politics and society coming 
later as the ‘superstructure’.
Expect Xi’s 19th Congress political report to 
show a lot of continuity with the previous 
report by his predecessor Hu Jintao. For 
example, the section of Hu’s report to the 
18th Congress on the Party’s overall goals for 
next five years required “comprehensively 
deepening reforms and opening in pursuit 
of a moderately prosperous society” (Xinhua 
2012b). Xi has put forward a series of 
initiatives in explicit response to Hu’s report, 
including providing 300 detailed reform 
steps at the 18th Congress’ third plenum, 
and will be judged on progress towards Hu’s 
goals.
In the 19th Congress report, Xi will also reveal 
some either moderate or radical differences 
from the previous report, to reflect new 
challenges and new political realties in the 
last five years. Until this particular political 
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report published, one cannot assess the 
concrete implications of those shifts from 
the past.
According to the recent official media 
coverage, the 19th Congress report may 
devote expanded sections on party 
discipline, economic supply-side policies, 
environmental issues and foreign affairs. 
And it wouldn’t be a surprise to see a 
reference to the ‘One Belt, One Road’ 
initiative, Xi’s signature policy initiative of 
the past few years (Yu, 2017). How much is 
he able to stamp his own policy agenda on 
this report is another test of his power and 
authority within the Party.
WILL ThE PArTY ConSTITUTIon 
InCLUDE ‘XI JInPInG ThoUGhT’?
One of the key questions for the global 
media is if Xi will incorporate a new doctrine 
of so-called “Xi Jinping thought” when the 
CCP revises its Party Constitution during 
the 19th Congress (Xinhua, 2017). This would 
essentially state that one of the party’s 
policy principles would be to follow Xi’s 
ideas. Any “successful revision to add Xi 
Jinping Thought as the Party’s guiding 
ideology would confirm Xi’s consolidation 
of supreme power because he puts himself 
on a par with Mao” (Nikkei Asian Review, 
2017; SCMP, 2017). 
However, “there have been occasional 
references scattered in low-level PRC 
media over the past five years to ‘Xi 
Jinping Thought’, there have been none 
in authoritative leadership statements or 
commentary. References to Xi’s thinking 
on specific policy sectors appeared 
occasionally” (Miller, 2017).
Expect the party constitution to make 
reference to Xi’s policies on party discipline 
and prepare him to enter the pantheon 
of the Party’s guiding ideology like his 
predecessors together with Karl Marx and 
Vladimir Lenin. But it remains to be seen 
how the Party will revise its constitution and 
what exact choice of the words appears in 
the official media’s 19th Congress coverage, 
either with his name attached or not. 
This will be another clear benchmark to 
assess Xi and its team’s power and authority. 
As there have been no particular explicit 
reference to “Xi Jinping Thought” in any 
official media coverage, any revisions from 
the October gathering will be credited 
to a collective leadership of 18th Central 
Committee not just Xi himself.
ConCLUSIon
The CCP Congress remains one of the 
world’s most complex political gatherings 
and fascinates not just China watchers 
but also global investors and political 
practitioners in general. 
However, much of the discussion in the 
West is based on arbitrary speculation. 
An examination of official press coverage, 
Congress political reports, and Party 
constitution revision procedures suggest 
no evidence to indicate that the 19th CCP 
Congress will radically depart from the 
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previous de-facto rules and conventions set by Deng Xiaoping in the early 1980s. The sense 
of continuity is too prevalent in a ruling Party run by collective leadership through seeking 
broad consensus to return to one single supreme leader anchoring the show. 
Deng Xiaoping’s landmark reforms not only built modern China, but also profoundly shaped 
how the CCP senior cadres are examined and the leadership baton is passed to the each 
generation of leaders. After nearly 40 years of economic reform at home and a bold opening 
to the global economy during the 1990s, the world’s largest ruling Party faces a new set of 
challenges and is asking itself where it might be heading. 
Within the next five years, China will enter its final stage of achieving its overarching goals of 
establishing a  “moderately prosperous society” by 2020, with the Centenary of the Chinese 
Communist Party in 2021. Domestically, continuous economic growth has produced vested 
interest groups that refuse to give up their existing power and authority which, together with 
huge income inequality and appalling air pollution, could challenge the very survival of the 
Party leadership. On the foreign affairs front, it looks like Deng’s approach of “keeping a low 
profile” is being replaced by Xi Jinping’s more proactive approach which seeks to promote 
Chinese core interests more forcefully while asserting China’s ‘rightful’ status in global order. 
Xi clearly knows that he is facing a much higher level of political risk than either of his two 
predecessors after Deng in both domestic politics and foreign affairs. He needs to strike a fine 
balance that can satisfy both elites and the ordinary public alike in his second term in office. 
The 19th CCP congress is inevitably a beginning rather than an end in itself. One can only 
hope that this Party congress will be based on an innovative reading of the past and a belief 
that prosperity is not only essential for China’s future development, but more importantly the 
only means to maintain the Party’s very own legitimacy and survival.  
1 These are the Chinese People’s Congress and the Chinese People’s Political Consultative Congress convened 
in early March every year to discuss the work of central government.
2  Sun Zhengcai, who was the party secretary of Chong Qing, an important municipality, was removed from 
the Politburo due to discipline breach on 24th July 2017
3  For a full explanation of collective leadership, please refer to the author’s piece in From Deng to Xi: 
Economic Reform, the New Silk Road, and the Return of the Middle Kingdom
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